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Abstract 
One option of the ASTRID prototype power conversion systems (PCS) is the steam cycle based on the Rankine cycle, which 
has been implemented in the past in France in the Phénix and Superphénix Sodium Fast Reactors, and is also being 
implemented in other SFRs in construction in the world (Russia, India, China). 
This paper is placed in the context of the Rankine cycle ameliorations and in particular on the Steam Generator (SG), 
developed by AREVA, from the safety point of view without significant penalty on cost. Therefore significant progresses are 
awaited to reduce sodium/water reaction accident scenario impact as much by prevention as by mitigation. 
Following the ICAPP 2010 paper (1), ASTRID project performed a thorough comparison of SG designs with regard to these 
safety requirements but also including increased sodium/water segregation (inlet and outlet of sodium implemented at the 
bottom of the SG), material issues and cost considerations. The design is based today on a monolithic SG with alloy 800 
helical tubes but equipped with geometric specificities necessary for allowing the use of a single component per secondary 
loop. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFR) is one of the 
Generation IV reactor concepts selected to secure the 
nuclear fuel resources and to manage radioactive waste. In 
the frame of the June 2006 French act on sustainable 
management of radioactive materials and wastes, French 
Government entrusted CEA to conduct design studies of 
ASTRID (Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor for 
Industrial Demonstration) prototype in collaboration with 
industrial partners. 
One option of the ASTRID prototype power 
conversion systems (PCS) is the steam cycle based on the 
Rankine cycle, which has been implemented in the past in 
France in the Phénix and Superphénix Sodium Fast 
Reactors, and is also being implemented in other SFRs in 
construction in the world (Russia, India, China). 
This paper is placed in the context of the Rankine 
cycle improvements and in particular on the Steam 
Generator (SG), developed by AREVA, from the safety 
point of view without significant penalty on cost. Therefore 
significant progresses are awaited to reduce sodium/water 
reaction accident scenario impact as much by prevention as 
by mitigation. 
The paper (1) presented at ICAPP10 Conference was 
investigating several ways to achieve such a goal: research 
of designs favoring prevention and other mitigation. An 
envelope scenario was considered to determine the design 
conditions, i.e. the instantaneous rupture of all tubes, at 
least for safety extended situations (on accidents beyond 
category 4, occurrence probability less than 10-7 
/reactor/year). SG modularity and main secondary circuit 
adaptations allowed satisfying such a new requirement.  
The objective of the present paper is to provide what has 
been performed by the ASTRID project from the ICAPP10 
paper (1) leading to the current SG design. 
II. DESIGN OF ASTRID SG 
The main orientations for ASTRID steam generators are:  
- Master the secondary loop complexity by choosing 
once-through integral modules: it limits costs, 
maintenance and sodium fire risks on secondary 
loops. 
- Provide possibility to demonstrate SG, secondary 
loop and Intermediate Heat eXchanger (IHX) 
integrity under postulated simultaneous DEGF 
(Double Ended Guillotine Failure) of all the tubes 
of one SG module. In that hypothesis the SWR 
Proceedings of ICAPP 2015 
May 03-06, 2015 - Nice (France) 
Paper 15236 
   
(Sodium Water Reaction) events are bounded by a 
scenario which does not depend on leak detection 
performance. It leads to an intrinsically safe SG 
design in any envelope scenario regarding SWR. 
- Provide enhanced ISI&R (In-Service Inspection & 
Repair) capabilities and SWR detection system. 
- Consider investment cost efficiency by evaluating 
the entire system (SG + secondary loop + cost of the 
SG building). 
II.A. ASTRID SG Design Selection 
In the first phase of ASTRID option definition, all kind 
of SG designs have been investigated. Then, after a first 
phase of evaluation, the study was concentrated on three 
Steam Generator types: EFR (European Fast Reactor) type 
Straight tubes with bellows on external shell, PFBR 
(Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor) type Straight tubes with 
bends on heat exchange tubes, modified design of the SPX 
(Superphénix) type Helical tubes SG (from left to right: 
and bottom in the following Figure 1) [2]. 
Set of criteria was put on: 
- Safety: SWR and SWAR (Sodium Water Air 
Reaction) management,  
- ISI&R,  
- R&D efforts: cost & risks, time required, 
- Manufacturing: cost & risks, qualification program, 
industrial capabilities, control performances, 
- Reliability: TRL (Technology Readiness Level) 
maturity level, experience feedback, design 
margins, corrosion and material risks, ageing 
effects, 
- Impact on the reactor Plant Layout: secondary loop 
complexity, SG building surface and volume, 
volume of auxiliary systems, 
- Investment cost. 
To allow a proper Steam Generators comparison, 
several engineering and R&D studies were carried on from 
2010 to 2013 in fields where significant knowledge gaps 
were highlighted. In particular an important R&D program 
was launched on martensitic-ferritic steel (T91) and alloy 
800 austenitic steel (A800) materials. The goal was to be 
able to compare their behaviour in steam and sodium 
environment and to complete the wastage database for T91 
steel thanks to experimental tests carried on with JAEA 
(Japan Atomic Energy Agency) and IGCAR facilities. [3]  
These results contributed to adapt the related safety 
computing codes on those specific materials [4]: 
PROPANA code on wastage rates prediction; and 
MECTUB code for tube rupture times.  
On material, R&D studies showed that the ferritic-
martensitic steels are more sensitive to the generalized 
corrosion and present an important wastage and leaks auto-
evolution rates.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The three type of SG design for ASTRID final 
selection (from left to right and bottom: straight tubes, with bends 
on straight tubes, helical tubes). 
Recent experimental tests (see examples on figure 2) 
confirmed that wastage rates are varying in a range from 2 
to 10 times quicker than A800 (depending on operating 
parameters and mainly temperature). The austenitic alloys 
have a better behaviour towards the above phenomena, but 
are sensitive to the stress corrosion in sodium hydroxides 
presence.  
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It can be outlined that T91 presents good mechanical 
properties at high temperatures. But the R&D reveals that 
the cyclic behaviour and fatigue of the Alloy 800 and the 
modified T91 are different: for the ferritic-martensitic 
grade, the plastic deformation during cycling at high 
temperature (T≥500°C) induces a change in the dislocation 
densities and in the sub-grain sizes. A mechanical softening 
is then observed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  
Some experimental results carried on SG tubes to adjust codes.  
Up: bursting of heated tubes on the SQUAT facility  
(Cadarache, France). [4] 
Down: Impingement test realised on SWAT-1R facility  
(O Arai, Japan). [3] 
Such a phenomenon is completely different from what 
is observed in austenitic stainless steels as Alloy 800, for 
which the plastic deformation during cycling leads to a 
cyclic hardening. The consideration of component lifetime 
could also be a crucial point on material selection. For 
ASTRID, SG lifetime for design has been set to thirty 
years. 
Concerning design, it appears that the straight tubes 
design with bellows on the shell is more difficult to justify 
towards thermo-mechanical behaviour than tubes with 
expansion bends designs.  
The BN-600 design (Russia) [5] is a successful 
example of long term industrial operation of such SG, but it 
was built with three stage unit (evaporator / super heater / 
re-heater) and with a modularity aspect (8 SG per 
secondary loop). The straight tubes design with expansion 
bends on the tubes allows a higher flexibility to 
accommodate differential thermal expansions, especially 
between the different tubes. On the other hand, due to the 
bend on the tubes, the manufacturing sequence and the 
tube supporting system need to be adapted accordingly. 
PFBR SG design is a representative example with design 
and manufacturing accomplishment, but this component 
has been down-sized to 157 MWth. The feedback of this 
component in operation will be a precious gain of 
knowledge. 
The SPX SG has demonstrated the ability to realize 
and operate large helical type SG unit. Diverse similar 
components tested in the world with limited power (a few 
tenths of MWth) operated also with no major problem 
encountered. Finally even if SPX 750 MWth with A800 
alloy tubes provides a sound basis, this option lacks of long 
duration experience feedback.  
For ASTRID, AREVA engineering company has 
targeted an innovative interest linked with this design. 
Indeed it is possible to set-up compact secondary loops 
designs by implementing both sodium outlet and entry at 
the bottom of the SG (Fig. 3). It provides a more rational 
separation of the sodium and steam piping systems. It 
allows demonstrating a better physical separation of the 
sodium/water risks. 
 
Fig. 3.  
Evolution in SG Helical tube design and its secondary loop. 
Left: Cold outlet (blue) at the bottom of the SHG, hot inlet (red) at 
the top 
Right: Inlet and outlet at the bottom of the SG 
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For a same unit power, the SG design with sodium inlet 
and outlet at the bottom side is offering a better risk 
management by segregating sodium hot and cold legs at 
the plant layout bottom part, and hot steam inlet at the top 
of the steam generator. It then simplifies the drawing of 
physical separation with different levels of the steam 
generator building (separation by floors).  
Regarding protection systems, they are designed in all 
cases to quickly detect water leak in sodium before any 
secondary leak ignition. In addition and complementary to 
the conventional hydrogen detection system, active 
acoustic detection are envisioned to enhance detection 
velocity. This is specially recommended when using 
ferritic-martensitic steels since it has a weaker behaviour 
towards leak auto-evolution and wastage than the alloy 800 
In all cases the SG unit power was adjusted in order to 
cope with the envelope scenario of all tubes simultaneous 
DEGF within one SG module. 
II.B. ASTRID SG Type Choice 
The ASTRID SG final selection was carried out during 
the first phase of ASTRID conceptual design studies called 
AVP1 (includes design, structural analysis, thermal-
hydraulics, flow induced vibrations, SWR calculations, 
experience feedback, ISI&R evaluation, etc.). In addition 
analyses on a multi-criteria grid based on the previous 
studies are performed. Experts’ evaluations are done. Thus 
periodic experts meetings were conducted in the different 
fields over 2 years. The conclusions were that there was no 
reason to eliminate de facto one specific design amongst 
the three pre-selected. Indeed, all designs get advantages & 
drawbacks and the final synthesis - without taking account 
of the investment costs - provides results in a very tight 
space.  
The experimental feedback of all industrial SG 
operations did not provide a clear advantage to one specific 
concept. Nevertheless it was confirmed that A800 has a 
real better behaviour regarding the SWR reaction 
(wastage). In addition the evaluation of the entire system 
including SG plus secondary loop plus SG building is 
providing an advantage to the Helical tube SG because: 
- Inlet & outlet at the bottom is well fitted to reduce 
the length of the secondary loop, 
- The drawings provide a better segregation of the 
sodium and steam parts, 
- The SG building is reduced (20 m compared to 28 
m for a Straight Tubes SG option). 
II.C. ASTRID SG Unit Power Adjustment 
The size of each module is such that the largest 
possible sodium-water reaction, corresponding to a failure 
of the whole tube bundle of one SG, can be accommodated 
without excessive loadings on the SG casings, but also on 
the secondary sodium piping system, and the intermediate 
heat exchangers within the primary system.  
This avoids the need of a difficult demonstration on 
the limit of propagation of failures from one tube to the 
neighbouring tubes in a large bundle.  
In terms of safety, consideration of such accident 
should contribute to the robustness of the demonstration as 
it would ensure avoidance of any cliff edge effect which 
might be linked to the assumptions regarding the number 
of tubes failures or to the kinetics of the phenomena 
leading to the failure of several tubes (see Ref. 1). 
To meet and check this condition, parametric 
calculations have been performed. Progressive unit powers 
are assessed to study the consequences of the bounding 
case of a simultaneous and instantaneous rupture of all 
tubes within one SG module. This has been done to 
evaluate whether integrity of the secondary system can be 
maintained at intermediate heat exchanger level, at sodium 
loop level, and also at Steam Generator level.  
By a combination of several configurations, the most 
influent parameters on the dynamic pressure were 
progressively learned: additional discharge lines on hot and 
cold pipes, discharge pipe diameter, positioning of the 
discharge line close to the SG and IHX components.  
Calculations were performed with the fast dynamics 
code EUROPLEXUS [6], using the finite element method 
and an explicit resolution in time.  
The validation of this code for the sodium-water 
reaction simulation has been performed by comparison 
with other codes or with analytical calculations and large 
scale sodium water reaction tests performed during the 
development of the Superphenix SG. The secondary loop is 
modelled with 1D tube finite elements. Tubes are filled 
with sodium, argon gas at the top of each SG, and hydrogen 
produced by the sodium water reaction are accounted of. 
The structures are not modelled (no fluid/structure 
interaction). Singular pressure drops and roughness of the 
pipes are taken into account and some specific elements 
like the rupture disks are modelled. The gravity is applied 
and the initial nominal absolute pressure is set to 3 bar in 
the whole model. The initial velocity of the sodium in the 
secondary loop, which is low, is not taken into account.  
Initially the model of the secondary loop was adjusted 
with six SG modules of 100 MWth for comparison with 
EFR design as reference concept. Then, by adjusting the 
loop design, the allowable ASTRID SG unit power was 
progressively raised to 125 MWth (three SG per loop for 
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ASTRID) to finally reach a configuration with 375 MWth 
Helical type SG (one SG per loop for ASTRID, four in 
totals), see Fig. 4 and 5. 
Thus, it was progressively demonstrated that the 
respect of the envelope SWR scenario could be achieved 
with any kind of helical type SG power from 100 to 375 
MWth. It must be noted that the value of 375 MWth was 
an upper limit value. An extension to 500 MWth power 
(for instance in a three loop configuration, one SG per 
loop) did not provide satisfactory results.  
Therefore the power unit adjustment could be done by 
considering a grid of evaluations where all different 
aspects were quoted and where the cost evaluation was 
compared with the first modular system studied for 
ASTRID during the AVP1 phase (three SG per loop, 125 
MWth each). 
This choice has proven a significant gain regarding 
ISIR, global arrangement and investment cost in choosing 
monolithic SG. That led the project to select for the AVP2 
phase an ASTRID SG configuration with four 375 MWth 
Power helical SG with sodium inlet and outlet at the 
bottom part of the component (one SG per loop).  
By selecting this option, ASTRID project has made the 
choice to strongly limit the modularity approach in steam 
generator design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Description of the secondary loop configuration for the 
EUROPLEXUS Code [6] and corresponding calculation results. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Evolution of the ASTRID configuration from three SG 
(125 MWth each) to one single SG (375 MWth). 
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II.C. Safety considerations and SWR management / 
approach for ASTRID SG 
ASTRID safety orientations are based on the line-of-
defence method for analysing prevention of severe 
accident, completed by line of mitigation method for 
analysing the mitigation of severe accident. 
The SWR reaction was classified during the European 
Fast Reactor (EFR) project as follows: 
-  A small SG tube leak in category 2 conditions, 
corresponding to an occurrence frequency higher 
than 10-2 per reactor-year, 
-  A guillotine-tube rupture in category 3 conditions, 
corresponding to an occurrence frequency between 
10-2 to 10-4 per reactor-year, 
-  A larger number of about ten guillotine-tube 
ruptures in category 4 conditions, corresponding to 
an occurrence frequency below 10-4 per reactor-
year, 
-  It can moreover be underlined that SG tubes were 
designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake 
in category 4 conditions.  
Nevertheless, due to the large number of SG tubes 
involved, the guillotine rupture of a tube was 
conservatively assumed and the loadings on the 
intermediate heat exchanger due to both the earthquake and 
the sodium-water reactions were combined.  
For all the above situations, leak tightness of the 
secondary system, in particular at intermediate heat 
exchanger level, was demonstrated. More severe scenarios, 
considering sequential tubes failures up to the rupture of all 
tubes of a single SG unit were besides studied, for which 
integrity of the intermediate sodium loop was still 
maintained. 
For ASTRID project, the envelop scenario of a 
simultaneous guillotine rupture of all tubes has been 
positioned in the domain of severe accident prevention 
(SP) corresponding to an occurrence frequency between 
10-4 and 10-7 per reactor-year. 
In practice, to eliminate or reduce the risk of sodium-
water reaction in a steam generator, we have to prevent 
from effects of steam water leaks, or minimise its 
consequences on the intermediate system. For this, 
successive independent measures operating at several 
levels are implemented.  
All these measures have associated methods; there are 3 
categories:  
 Prevention methods, 
 Detection methods, 
 Mitigation methods. 
The prevention of failures in the tube bundle is based 
on a high quality manufacture and inspection (RCCM-R 
quality level 1 and compliance with nuclear pressure 
equipment requirements). This high manufacture and 
inspection qualities is combined with the choice of the 
suitable material of the SG tubes to prevent the worsening 
of a water leak in a steam generator. Indeed, it has been 
shown that the wastage resistance of the tube varies 
according to the nature of the material.  
In this regard, the latest experimental results on 
wastage (see examples on Figs. 6 and 7) provided decisive 
new data on the wastage resistance of SG tubes made of 
9%Cr. Those data confirm that the maximum rate of 
damage by wastage of a 9%Cr tube for a leak located at the 
bottom of the tube bundle (sodium temperature of 350°C) 
is around double than tubes made of alloy 800 under the 
same operating conditions.  
For leaks located at the top of the bundle (500°C), the 
wastage rate of the 9%Cr tubes is significantly higher than 
for alloy 800 tubes, by a factor which varies (by around 6 
to more than 10) according to the leak flow rate being 
considered.  
The addition of "anti-wastage" plate type devices over 
the welds is a solution that can be considered but only for 
straight-tube SG concepts. For Helical tube SG the main 
action is to determine the welding zone away from thermo-
mechanical stressed zone like the Departure of Nucleate 
Boiling (DNB) zone. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Wastage rate evolution for several materials 9Cr, 12Cr and 
SUS321. Experimental conditions:  
TNa = 480°C, Twater = 331°C, Pwater = 128 bar, distance 
between leaky and target tubes = 16,2 mm 
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the wastage rates between 9Cr and 
A800 alloys (curves obtained from PROPANA code calculations) 
Therefore, an appropriate choice of design – such as 
Helical SG tube with A800 - provides an additional margin 
in terms of the response times of the detection systems and 
the protection operations. 
The detection of failures of a steam generator tube 
combines redundant active systems, associated with means 
of quickly protecting the SGs (detailed below):  
 
- Hydrogen detection in sodium and in Argon (Fig. 
8): "Boundary" values for the increase in the 
measured hydrogen concentration, considered to 
indicate a leak, are determined by prior calibration 
of this measurement. If these values are exceeded, 
first of all (alarm threshold) a warning for the 
operators is triggered, then automatic actions are 
initiated to set the SG to a safe fall-back 
configuration (fast isolation and depressurization 
sequence described below, and sodium drainage). 
The main purpose of the detection system is to 
check that the initial leak can be detected before 
impingement or rupture of the neighbouring tubes 
leading to secondary leaks by respectively wastage 
or swelling-bursting effect. 
- Acoustic detection can be used in addition to 
hydrogen detection. Its main advantage is its fast 
response time, as there is no transit time as with 
those for hydrogen detection. 
- The other detection systems used to protect the SG 
include pressure measurements in the expansion 
tank (as with the UK PFR SG) to detect the increase 
in pressure following a large leak. There is also a 
disc rupture detection device (Fig. 8), based on the 
use of sodium detectors on the relief line 
downstream the rupture discs. This detection device 
triggers the other protection actions: fast shutdown 
of the reactor and fast isolation/depressurization of 
the steam-water in the SG, and sodium draining. 
In argon hydrogen
detection
In sodium hydrogen
detection
 
Fig. 8. Integration in a SG of the main safety devices 
The Mitigation of a SWR in ASTRID SGs consists of: 
- The fast isolation and depressurization system. It is 
actuated (and shut downs the reactor) as soon as a 
leak is detected (either by hydrogen detection or by 
rupture of the safety discs). These systems are said 
to be "active" because they require implementation 
and a diagnosis. The purpose of these operations is 
to prevent the sodium from entering the secondary 
loop in the SG tubes and the steam-water circuit. 
Thus, during the whole SG depressurization phase, 
which happens at the same time as the discharge of 
the sodium in the case of leaks leading to the 
rupture of the safety discs, the steam-water circuit is 
kept in excess of pressure in relation to the sodium 
vessel in order to prevent any pollution of the 
steam-water side by the sodium. 
- Rupture discs and a discharge circuit. They enable 
decompression and fast draining of the SG on the 
sodium side if there is a significant sodium-water 
reaction. The effect of the increase in pressure 
following an SWR (acoustic pressure wave then 
followed by mass transfer) leads to these discs 
rupture and the sodium drains out due to gravity. 
This is therefore a "passive protection" system. This 
device is designed to protect the IHXs, which form 
part of the primary confinement, against the 
mechanical effects associated with a sodium-water 
reaction, and to make acceptable the pollution of the 
loop by the reaction products. 
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II.D. Summary of the ASTRID SG design for the AVP2 
phase 
The final selection of the ASTRID SG for the AVP2 
phase is summarized hereafter (Table 1, Figs. 9 and 10). 
 
 
SPX GV750 
MWth
ASTRID SG 375 
MW (initial design)
Power MWth 750 375
Tube number - 357 240
External tubes diameter mm 25 22
Tube thickness mm 2,6 2,7
Tube length m 91,5 87,3
Helical bundle heigth m 11,9 11,06
Water mass flow kg/s 340 169,5
Total pressure drop in water side Bars 31,4 34,2
Steam speed m/s 52,00 54,80  
 
TABLE I: Synthesis of the main characteristics of the 
ASTRID Steam Generator 
It remains to determine during the AVP2 phase a more 
precise design of the SG associated to the identification of 
sensitive points. Furthermore, the points that require 
additional R&D works and qualification process in specific 
fields such as material, fabrication rules, thermal-
hydraulic, etc, will be defined. 
 
 
Fig. 9. ASTRID Main Secondary Loop with monolithic SG 
 
 
Fig. 10. ASTRID A800 helical tubes monolithic SG 
III. CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to explain and justify the choice of 
ASTRID SG design (a 375 MWth helical tube SG with 
sodium inlet and outlet located at the component bottom 
part). 
It has been shown that this design selection compared 
to straight tube steam generator was tricky and was finally 
justified by a better plant layout, and a reduced height of 
the SG building.  
Moreover, the high tube material resistance option 
towards wastage effects is an additional argument for the 
safety approach. 
ASTRID basic safety approach was to demonstrate an 
intrinsic safety demonstration regarding the SWR in a 
worst case envelope scenario.  
This safety demonstration could be obtained by loop 
design adjustment for a 375 MWth SG leading to a choice 
of four SGs for ASTRID reactor (one SG per loop) with an 
account for techno-economic approach. 
Furthermore, the points that require additional R&D 
and qualification process in specific fields such as material, 
fabrication rules, thermal-hydraulic, etc, will be refined 
during the coming project phase. 
Water 
boxes 
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NOMENCLATURE 
ASTRID: Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor 
for Industrial Demonstration 
AVP1/2: Conceptual design studies, phase 1 /2 of 
ASTRID project 
A800: Alloy 800 austenitic steel 
BN600: 600 MWe SFR in Russia 
DEGF:  Double Ended Guillotine Failure 
DNB: Departure of Nucleate Boiling 
IHX:  Intermediate Heat eXchanger 
ISI&R: In-Service Inspection & Repair 
JAEA: Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
PFR: Prototype Fast reactor (UK) 
PFBR: Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (India) 
RCC-MR: French code for Design and Manufacturing 
of SFR components and structures 
R&D: Research and Development 
SFR:  Sodium Fast Reactor 
SG:  Steam Generator 
SPX:  Superphenix (French SFR) 
SWR:  Sodium Water Reaction 
SWAR: Sodium Water Air Reaction 
TNa: Sodium Temperature 
TRL: Technology Readiness Level 
Twater: Water Temperature 
T91:  Grade 91martensitic-ferritic steel  
1D: One-Dimensional  
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